Sometimes I get the feeling that too many Internet users (especially the younger generation) view 1995, or the beginning of commercialized Internet as the start of time itself. More specifically, I notice how people tend to have a short-term memory when it comes to security issues. A recent example of this was all the creative network exploitation scenarios that arose from the great DNS cache poisoning scare of 2008: intercepting e-mails destined for the MX of users who didn’t really click on “Forgot Password,” pushing out phony updates, innovative twists on spear phishing, etc. The fact of the matter is that man-in-the-middle attacks were always a problem; cache poisoning makes them easier but their feasibility has always been within reason. My point is that vendors should address such weaknesses before the proverbial fertilizer hits the windmill.
Too often, short-term memory is the catalyst for reoccurring breaches of information. Sometimes I wonder what (if anything) goes through the mind of one of those celebrities that just got their cell phone hacked for the third time. Maybe it’s something like, “Oh.. those silly hackers! They’ve probably gotten bored by now and they’ll just go away.” Then I wonder how often similar thoughts enter corporate security (in)decision–which is likely to be why cellular carriers neglect to shield their clientele’s voicemail from caller ID spoofing and other shenanigans. Nonetheless, the amusing charade that 2600 pulled on the Obama campaign for April Fool’s Day was simply a case of people believing everything they read on the Internet.
Don’t get me wrong. I’ve seen some major improvements in how larger software vendors are dealing with vulnerabilities, but an overwhelming majority of their security processes are still not up to par. Short-term memory is one of those cases where wetware is the weakest link in the system.
The idea of the digital security industry using long-term memory to become more like insurance companies and less like firefighters is quite intriguing. Putting protective forethought into the equation dramatically changes the playing field. Imagine an SDLC where programmers don’t have to know how to write secure code, or even patch vulnerable code for that matter. I can say for sure that such a proposition will become reality in the not too distant future. Stay tuned…